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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioner appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post conviction 
relief raising two issues. 
The first is an ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleging failure to file 
an appeal. The court at first held that this claim survived summary judgment, but 
later dismissed it after the court concluded that it did not have the jurisdiction to 
grant the requested relief. The second is an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim alleging failure to preserve a speedy trial claim. This claim was summarily 
dismissed because the court held that the speedy trial claim would not have been 
meritorious even if preserved. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The facts (which Mr. Huntsman disputes) and procedure are succinctly 
described in the published opinion issued in the direct appeal. The Court of 
Appeals in State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580 (Ct. App. 2008), explained as 
follows: 
The evidence presented at trial was that in March 2005, Huntsman 
and Larry Hanslovan kidnapped Kyle Quinton and Becky Boden 
and took them to Barbara Dehl's residence, where the three bound 
Quinton and Boden with packing tape, beat them, and questioned 
them about jewelry that Dehl claimed was missing from a safe in 
her house. During the incident, someone implicated John 
Schmeichel in the theft of the jewelry. Hanslovan and Huntsman 
then released Quinton from the restraints and took him to find 
Schmeichel. 
When the parties arrived at the residence where Schmeichel was 
staying, Hanslovan and Huntsman confronted him about the 
allegedly stolen property. Subsequently, Schmeichel left with them 
in Hanslovan's vehicle. While they were driving back to Dehl's 
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residence, Huntsman turned around from his position in the front 
passenger seat and shot Schmeichel in the face with a .38 caliber 
revolver, killing him. When they reached Dehl's residence, 
Hanslovan and Huntsman enlisted Quinton's help in removing the 
body from the vehicle and wrapping it in trash bags and a tarp. A 
day or two later, Huntsman and Hanslovan drove to Elmore County 
where they and two other individuals dug a shallow grave and 
buried Schmeichel's body. 
A grand jury indicted Huntsman on one count of first degree murder 
with a sentence enhancement for using a firearm in the commission 
of the murder, and two counts of kidnapping. In the same 
indictment, Hanslovan was charged with two counts of kidnapping 
with firearm enhancements, and one count of trafficking in 
methamphetamine, and Dehl was charged with two counts of 
kidnapping and one count of trafficking in methamphetamine. After 
the court denied the defendants' motions for separate trials, but did 
allow the drug charges to be severed, Huntsman and his co-
defendants pied not guilty and trial was scheduled to begin on 
October 11, 2005. 
At a hearing on September 30, 2005, Dehl and Hanslovan moved 
to reschedule the trial for the purposes of continuing their 
investigation, and they waived their speedy trial rights. The state 
joined in the motion, advising the court that the previous day, one of 
its witnesses had turned over what was believed to be the murder 
weapon. The state requested that the trial be rescheduled to 
provide the parties the opportunity to investigate and test this newly 
discovered evidence. Huntsman, however, objected to the 
continuance and declined to waive his right to a speedy trial. The 
court granted the motion to continue as to Dehl and Hanslovan, but 
denied the state's request in regard to Huntsman, deciding that 
there was not good cause to continue the trial in light of Huntsman's 
assertion of his statutory speedy trial rights. 
On October 6, the state filed a motion to dismiss the charges 
against Huntsman without prejudice. After a hearing, the court 
granted the motion. Several days later, a second indictment was 
filed charging Huntsman with the same charges as he had initially 
faced. The state then moved to consolidate his case with those of 
Hanslovan and Dehl. Huntsman opposed the motion, but it was 
granted by the court. Trial was scheduled to begin on April 10, 
2006--almost six months after the second indictment had been 
filed. 
In January 2006, Huntsman filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that 
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his state and federal constitutional rights to a speedy trial had been 
intentionally violated when the prosecution dismissed and re-filed 
the identical charges. The district court never ruled on the motion 
and trial proceeded as scheduled--against Huntsman alone as his 
co-defendants negotiated plea bargains. 
After a ten-day trial, the jury found Huntsman guilty as charged. 
The district court entered a judgment of conviction and imposed a 
unified life sentence with thirty years determinate for the first 
degree murder conviction and firearm enhancement, and a 
concurrent unified sentence of twenty years with ten years 
determinate for the kidnapping conviction. Huntsman now appeals. 
Id. p. 582-583. 
To further detail the dismissal and re-filing of charges, it was the district 
court who sua sponte suggested to the state that it simply dismiss the case as to 
Mr. Huntsman and re-file and move to consolidate with the original case. (Tr. 
9/30/05, Vol. I, p. 73-86.1) While the state was arguing its motion to continue 
the trial, the following colloquy took place: 
THE COURT: I can certainly understand that, but I guess one 
obvious course is apparent to me, that I don't know why the State 
can't pursue this and so I will just ask you this. Inasmuch as Mr. 
Huntsman is asserting his statutory speedy trial rights, why can't 
the State simply dismiss and then move to consolidate on a refile 
charge? 
[PROSECUTOR] Move to dismiss against Mr. Huntsman? 
THE COURT: Right. And then move to consolidate if you later 
determine that you wish to proceed as against him without the need 
to address these speedy trial concerns that have been asserted by 
Mr. Huntsman? 
[PROSECUTOR]: May I have just a moment, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
1 The post conviction court took judicial notice of inter alia, Volume I and II of the 
trial transcript. (R. p. 588-589.) 
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[PROSECUTOR] Your Honor, a couple of things. I think the State--
the Court does have the authority to find good cause for a 
defendant whose not waiving, speedy trial is not up on him. He was 
arraigned May 5th-
THE COURT: Speedy trial rights run as the date of the filing of the 
indictment. Speedy trial expires on October 25th . We are talking 
about a two week continuance of the trial at best if we are to honor 
Mr. Huntsman's speedy trial rights. Recognizing that I have a four-
week trial set to start on October 31 5\ it would simply not coincide 
with my trial calendar. 
[PROSECUTOR] If we were forced to dismiss on Mr. Huntsman, 
obviously there would be no bond, there would be no pending 
case, and someone we have believe to have committed murder 
would be free for at least a period of time, which concerns the 
State, obviously. And I think in terms of the economy, the Court 
might view it differently to dismiss and refile and start again with 
one defendant is certainly burdensome for the State, I believe. 
Tr. 9/30/05, p. 81, In. 21-p. 83, In. 10 (emphasis added). 
As indicated above, since the state could not obtain the continuance it 
requested, it followed the court's suggestion and filed a motion to dismiss without 
prejudice, then re-filed the identical charges and moved to consolidate the new 
case with that of the co-defendants. 
Following the conviction after jury trial and sentencing, appointed counsel 
filed a notice of appeal from both the original case which had been dismissed 
without prejudice and also the new case where the charges had been re-filed. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed in its published opinion on December 2, 2008. (R. 
p. 592.) 
Relevant here, the Court of Appeals held that since appointed counsel 
failed to appeal within 42 days of the dismissal without prejudice of the original 
case (which was re-filed), Mr. Huntsman's appellate rights concerning the original 
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case were not preserved. Thus, the Court of Appeals would not address Mr. 
Huntsman's claims arising from the dismissal and re-filing, which he asserted 
included a due process violation resulting from the dismissal and re-filing for the 
purpose of gaining a tactical advantage over the defendant which also prejudiced 
him, error when the district court granted the state's motion to dismiss, as well as 
a deprivation of his due process right to an impartial judge since the judge 
coached the prosecution as to how to indirectly obtain the continuance that it 
could not directly obtain. 
Further, the Court of Appeals refused to address Mr. Huntsman's claim 
regarding the above-referenced January 2006 motion to dismiss for speedy trial 
violation filed in the new case, holding that appointed counsel failed to preserve 
the issue because he never obtained a ruling from the district court. 
Mr. Huntsman timely filed the instant verified pro se petition for post-
conviction relief on February 20, 2009. (R. p. 9.) Counsel was appointed and 
conflict counsel substituted for the Ada County Public Defender. (R. p. 102, 108.) 
Counsel ultimately filed a verified amended petition for post-conviction relief with 
affidavits and exhibits in support. (R. p. 156-170, 171-278.) The state filed an 
answer supported by exhibits. (R. p. 281-304, 305-434.) The state also filed a 
motion for summary disposition and brief in support. (R. p. 435-436, 438-447.) 
Petitioner filed a brief in opposition supported by an exhibit, to wit, Appellant's 
opening brief in the direct appeal. (R. 449-465, 466-534.) 
The district court then issued its Memorandum Opinion Re: State's Motion 
for Summary Dismissal which explained that Petitioner alleged 11 claims of 
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ineffective assistance of counsel in the pre-trial process, during trial and 
sentencing, and in connection with the failure to file a timely appeal, as well as a 
claim based on evidence of material facts not previously presented. (R. p. 593.) 
Relevant here, the court held that the claim regarding counsel's failure to 
timely file a notice of appeal survived summary disposition and would require an 
evidentiary hearing. (R. p. 597.) It summarily dismissed the claim related to 
failure to preserve the speedy trial issue for appeal. (R. p. 599-600.) The court 
also summarily dismissed all remaining claims except for the claim of newly 
discovered evidence.2 (R. p. 615.) 
An evidentiary hearing was held at which the court dismissed the claim of 
newly discovered evidence and later entered written findings. (R. p. 704.) 
As to the failure to appeal issue, the court allowed post-evidentiary briefing 
on issues raised at the evidentiary hearing, to wit, the timeliness of the petition 
and the jurisdiction of the court to provide any relief on the issue. (R. p. 709-
716, 718-722.) 
The court issued its written order dismissing the failure to appeal issue 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b), holding it had no jurisdiction to grant the relief 
sought. (R. p. 728.) A written judgment and amended judgment were entered. 
(R. p. 731, 732.) 
Appellant timely appeals. (R. p. 733.) 
2 Appellant is only challenging the dismissal of two claims here, to wit, the failure 




Whether the district court erred when it denied post-conviction relief on the failure 
to appeal issue because it erroneously ruled that it had no jurisdiction to grant the 
requested relief. 
11. 
Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed the claim that 
counsel failed to preserve the speedy trial issue because it erroneously ruled that 






THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF BECAUSE IT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT IT HAD NO 
JURISDICTION TO GRANT THE REQUESTED RELIEF 
Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal 
While an evidentiary hearing was held on this issue, the court ultimately 
decided that it did not have the power to grant the requested relief and so 
dismissed the claim pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b). Thus, the standard of review 
for summary disposition, rather than disposition following an evidentiary hearing, 
applies here. 
Summary disposition is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment 
under I.R.C.P. 56, with the facts construed and all reasonable inferences made in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 
759 (Ct.App. 1991 ). Allegations contained in the verified petition are deemed 
true for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing should be 
held. Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844 (Ct.App. 1994). If the allegations do not 
frame a genuine issue of material fact, the court may grant a motion to summarily 
dismiss, but if the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must 
conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id. 
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B. Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel 
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
well established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). The "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result." Id. at 686. 
Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy in 
order to be entitled to relief. The defendant must demonstrate both that his 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of 
the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau, 
116 Idaho 129 (1989); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986). 
C. The Issue and the Court's Rulings 
The failure to file appeal issue is explained in the court's Memorandum 
Opinion Re: State's Motion for Summary Dismissal (hereinafter Memorandum 
Opinion on Summary Disposition). The relevant portions of the district court's 
discussion follow, although for brevity's sake, the court's discussions of well 
established and unremarkable law have been omitted: 
Petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel 
when Mr. Myshin failed to directly appeal the trial court's Order to 
Dismiss in case number H0500555, issued on October 7, 2005. 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief at 4-5. Petitioner 
asserts that Mr. Myshin's failure to file such an appeal "led to 
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complete forfeiture of two issues on appeal: Petitioner's claim 
regarding the court's granting of the motion to dismiss without 
prejudice, and the claim that the judge improperly suggested a 
course of action to the prosecution." Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief at 5. In its decision on Petitioner's appeal of his 
conviction, the Idaho Court of Appeals declined to address the 
merits of these claims because Petitioner's failure to appeal the 
order dismissal within forty-two days resulted in such claims not 
being preserved for appeal. Huntsman 146 Idaho at 584,199 P.3d 
at 159. 
Petitioner asserts that Mr. Myshin did not consult with Petitioner 
regarding the advantage and disadvantages of an appeal, nor did 
he make a reasonable effort to discover Petitioner's wishes 
regarding an appeal. Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
at 4. In his affidavit filed in connection with the amended post-
conviction application, Petitioner states, "Mr. Myshin and I never 
had a conversation about appealing the Court's dismissal of the first 
case, or anything about appeal." Affidavit of Ronald John 
Huntsman, Sr. at 2. The State has not provided any evidence to 
contradict Petitioner's statement. 
Petitioner's appellate brief sets forth nonfrivolous grounds for 
appeal of the order of dismissal. See Petitioner's Opposition, 
Exhibit A at 32-36. Dismissal of an action pursuant to I.C.R. 
48(a)(2) is within the discretion of the trial court. Under this rule, two 
requirements must be met: "(1) that dismissal serve 'the ends of 
justice,' and (2) that dismissal serve 'the effective administration of 
the court's business."' State v. Avelar, 132 Idaho 775, 781, 979 
P.2d 648, 65 (1999). In granting the State's motion to dismiss 
without prejudice, the trial court set forth its reasoning as follows: 
The question is whether the Court ought to grant the motion 
under Rule 48A2 [sic], which is the applicable rule which 
requires a two-part finding, first that it advances the ends of 
justice. And second, that it is consistent with the effective 
administration of the Court's business. 
Ultimately, the ends of justice are served by a true outcome 
or the best extent that we can arrive at a true outcome by 
finding out what happened in the events giving rise to a 
criminal charge. I was faced on the motion to continue with 
one of two unacceptable alternatives. Either to use the 
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Court's order governing proceedings as an arbitrary bar to 
the exclusion of newly discovered evidence by the State, or 
alternatively to permit the State to proceed to trial with lately 
discovered evidence, which would have a corresponding 
prejudicial effect on the defendant. 
Neither of those were palatable alternatives from my 
perspective, and yet I had a situation where the defendant 
wished to assert his 19-3501 rights, and I chose to honor 
that assertion of rights. At this point, though, as opposed to 
the defendant's expressed desire to have a trial as quickly as 
possible as opposed to the ultimate truth-seeking functions 
of the Court, I think the latter interests are at greater 
importance, and it is consistent with the effective 
administration of the Court's business. 
For that reason, the State's motion to dismiss will be granted. 
This will not serve as a bar to reinitiation to murder charges, 
use of a firearm during the commission of a felony, 
kidnapping, and the kidnapping charges. 
As it relates to the allegations of potential prejudice, I would 
simply note that questions of prejudice from a constitutional 
speedy trial analysis are of matters that will be reserved to 
whatever judge makes decisions as to what will likely be a 
Barker versus Wingo-type analysis down the road, should 
the State be successful in persuading either a grand jury or a 
magistrate that probable cause exists to believe that the 
defendant committed the crimes of murder and kidnapping. 
Answer to Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Exhibit 8 at 
98-100. 
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in its analysis of the 
two factors set forth in I.C.R 48(a)(2) as applied to the 
circumstances of his case. First, although the trial court states that 
it chose to honor Petitioner's assertion of his speedy trial rights, the 
subsequent dismissal of the case so that the State could refile the 
charges was more of a punishment for defendant's assertion of 
those rights. This course of action also allowed the State to, in 
effect, obtain the continuance the court had previously denied. The 
dismissal also had the effect of potentially exposing Petitioner to 
the death penalty. While the court stated that allowing the newly 
discovered evidence to come in at trial in violation of the court's 
order governing proceedings would have had a prejudicial effect on 
Petitioner in reality the dismissal and refiling of charges was much 
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more harmful to Petitioner. Specifically, it allowed the State to reset 
the discovery cutoff, which gave the State more time to gather 
evidence against Petitioner, such as an FBI analysis of the murder 
weapon and the addition of two witnesses who had not been 
disclosed prior to the first trial setting. In essence, Petitioner asserts 
that the harmful effects of the court's order of dismissal did not 
serve the "ends of justice." See generally Petitioner's Opposition, 
Exhibit A at 32-36. 
As to the second factor, Petitioner asserts that the dismissal was 
contrary to the "effective administration of the court's business." As 
the State originally chose to file charges against Petitioner without 
having located the murder weapon, evidently the State felt 
comfortable proceeding to trial and presenting its case without 
evidence of the murder weapon. Petitioner raises reasonable 
arguments as to why this evidence could have been obtained by 
the State earlier with more diligence and investigation. According to 
Petitioner, the effective administration of the court's business would 
have been served by allowing the case to proceed to trial within the 
week as scheduled, avoiding the duplication of many pretrial 
proceedings that would attend the refiling of the charges. See 
generally Petitioner's Opposition, Exhibit A at 32-36. 
At this stage it is not necessary for this Court to determine the 
likelihood of the success of a appeal from the order of dismissal. 
See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 486. The Court concludes that 
Petitioner has demonstrated nonfrivolous grounds for appeal, such 
that a rational defendant would have wanted to appeal the order. 
Accordingly, Petitioner has raised an issue of fact as to whether his 
counsel's performance, in failing to file an appeal from the order of 
dismissal or consult with Petitioner about the possibility of such an 
appeal, was deficient. Petitioner has also raised an issue of fact as 
to whether such deficient performance resulted in prejudice. The 
fact that there were nonfrivolous appeal issues demonstrates a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's failure to consult with 
him about an appeal, he would have timely appealed; and indeed, 
Petitioner did attempt to raise these issues in the appeal from his 
conviction. Because Petitioner has demonstrated a genuine issue 
of fact regarding his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel as to 
Mr. Myshin's failure file an appeal of the order of dismissal, 
summary dismissal of this claim is not appropriate, and the matter 
will require an evidentiary hearing. 
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Memorandum Opinion on Summary Dismissal, p. 4-7.3 (R. p. 594-597.) 
At the evidentiary hearing, the district court gave notice on the record of 
the court's intention to dismiss Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failure to appeal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b). (R. p. 724.) 
According to the court, the original case had been dismissed and no judgment of 
conviction had been entered so the court did not have jurisdiction to grant the 
requested relief of re-entry of the order of dismissal so it could be appealed. (R. 
p. 724-725.) At that hearing, the state also brought an oral motion to amend its 
answer to the amended petition for post-conviction relief in order to assert an 
affirmative defense that the petition was not timely filed as to Petitioner's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the original case (as opposed to the claims 
arising from the re-filed case). (R. p. 725.) 
The district court entered written findings and conclusions in its 
Memorandum Decision and Order (hereinafter Final Decision): 
The basis for Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is 
that his trial counsel, Amil Myshin, failed to appeal the trial court's 
3 The court's discussion and analysis of the thwarted appellate argument 
obviously comes directly from Appellant's opening brief in the direct appeal which 
was attached as an exhibit to the Petitioner's Opposition to State's Motion for 
Summary Dismissal. (R. p. 466-532.) While the post-conviction court does a fair 
job of explaining the part of the argument challenging the criminal court's ruling 
on the I.C.R. 48(a)(2) dismissal, it fails to discuss the other asserted errors raised 
(but not considered) in the direct appeal. These include the due process 
violation resulting from the dismissal and re-filing for the purpose of gaining a 
tactical advantage over the defendant which also prejudiced him, as well as the 
deprivation of his due process right to an impartial judge since the judge coached 
the prosecution as to how to indirectly obtain the continuance that it could not 
directly obtain. While an extended discussion of those asserted errors is not 
necessary here since the post-conviction court otherwise found there were non-
frivolous issues, the rest of the arguments from Appellant's opening brief in the 
direct appeal will nevertheless be incorporated by this reference. 
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Order to Dismiss in Case No. H0500555, which entered on October 
7, 2005. That order dismissed all charges against Petitioner in 
Case No. H0500555. As noted above, the State has brought a 
motion to amend its Answer to Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief in order to assert an affirmative defense that the 
petition was not timely filed as to this claim. Petitioner asserts that 
the State has waived this affirmative defense by failing to timely 
raise the defense in its Answer to Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. For the reasons discussed below, however, the 
Court concludes that the State's motion to amend is moot. 
Final Decision, p. 3. (R. p. 726.) 
The district court went on to explain that it could sua sponte raise the 
statute of limitations issue and so the state's motion to amend its answer to 
include it is unnecessary. (R. p. 725-726.) 
As to the merits of the issue, the district court held as follows: 
.... Idaho Code section 19-4902(a) provides that an application for 
post-conviction relief "may be filed at any time within one (1) year 
from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination 
of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an 
appeal, whichever is later." The Court notes that Petitioner filed an 
appeal in both Case No. H0501438 and Case No. H0500555. 
However, the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that the notice of 
appeal in Case No. H0500555 was untimely, as it was not filed 
within 42 days of the dismissal of that case as to Petitioner. See 
Huntsman, 146 Idaho a 583-84, 199 P.3d at 158-59. A "timely 
notice of appeal is a prerequisite for an appellate court to have 
jurisdiction to review a case." Id. at 583, 199 P.3d at 158, citing 
I.AR. 21 and State v. Payan 128 Idaho 866, 867, 920 P.2d 82, 83 
(Ct. App. 1996). Further, an untimely notice of appeal does not 
extend the limitation period set forth in I.C. § 19-4902(a); 
if no appeal is filed from a judgment of conviction, the one-
year limitation period for a post-conviction action 
commences on the forty-third day after judgment. It runs 
from that same date if an applicant filed a direct appeal that 
is later determined to be untimely and therefore invalid .... An 
untimely notice of appeal in the criminal case cannot 
postpone the commencement of the limitation period 
because a time-barred notice of appeal does not confer 
jurisdiction on the appellate courts and, thus, there is no 
valid appeal for an appellate court to "determine" that could 
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extend the postconviction statute of limitation under I.C. § 
49--4902(a). 
Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 385, 256 P.3d 791,793 (Ct. App. 
2011) (internal citations omitted). Petitioner concedes that his 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief, which Petitioner filed on 
February 20, 2009, was filed more than three years after the Order 
to Dismiss entered in Case No. H0500555 on October 7, 2005. 
Consequently, the Petition for Post Conviction Relief as to 
Petitioner's remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
concerning Case No. 0500555 is untimely and may be dismissed. 
However, the Court concludes that the more appropriate basis for 
dismissal of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is 
the Court's lack of jurisdiction to take any action regarding Case 
No. H0500555. The remedies under the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act are available to persons who have "been convicted 
of, or sentenced for, a crime." I.C. § 19-4901(a). The Idaho Court of 
Appeals has noted that a post-conviction relief proceeding "is 
designed to permit a challenge to an underlying conviction" or to 
an illegal sentence. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2 
1323, 1327(Ct. App. 1992). Although Petitioner was convicted of 
the charges brought in Case No. H0501438, no judgment of 
conviction entered in Case No. H0500555. The specific relief 
sought by Petitioner with regard to his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is that the Court set aside the Order to Dismiss that 
entered in Case No. H0500555 and reenter the order of dismissal, 
thereby reinstating Petitioner's right to appeal the dismissal of the 
charges against him in Case No. H0500555. See Petitioner's 
Memorandum of Law at 4. However, the Court's jurisdiction to 
grant the relief requested expired 42 days after Case No. 
H0500555 was dismissed as to Petitioner. See State v. Johnson, 
152 Idaho 41, --, 266 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2011 ). In State v. Johnson, 
the Idaho Supreme Court noted, 
"Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial 
court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires 
once the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the 
time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal." .. 
. . A district court's dismissal of a criminal case is tantamount 
to a judgment and is final 42 days later, when the time for 
appeal runs .... Jurisdiction of a criminal matter thus expires 
42 days after the district court dismisses the case unless an 
appeal or some statute or rule extends that jurisdiction. 
152 Idaho at --, 266 P .3d at 1152 (internal citations omitted); see 
also Huntsman, 146 Idaho at 583 84, 199 P.3d at 158-59. Whereas 
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the Court has authority under the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act to grant appropriate relief in a case where there has 
been a conviction, Petitioner has not demonstrated that there is any 
statute or rule that would extend the Court's jurisdiction in criminal 
case in which the charges against Petitioner have been dismissed. 
The Court notes that jurisdictional questions are "fundamental 
issues" that the Court "must address regardless of whether the 
parties themselves have raised them." Johnson, 152 Idaho at --, 
266 P.3d at 1152, citing State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 328, 246 
P.3d 979, 981 (2011 ). Because the Court lacks the jurisdiction to 
grant the relief sought by Petitioner in Case No. H0500555, or to 
take any further action in that case, the Court concludes that 
dismissal of Petitioner's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 
is appropriate pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b). 
Final Decision, p. 4-5 (emphasis added, footnote omitted) (R. p. 727-728.) 
D. The Court Erred in Denying Post-Conviction Relief 
Appellant asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed 
the failure to appeal claim. The district court did not change any of its rulings 
from its Memorandum Opinion on Summary Disposition denying summary 
disposition as to this claim, which, in short, were that counsel failed to file a 
notice of appeal from the original case, but a rational person would have desired 
to do so since there were non-frivolous appellate issues. 
Rather, the district court ultimately held that it lacked the power to grant 
the requested relief, which was the re-entering of the order of dismissal so that 
Mr. Huntsman could appeal it within 42 days. By this ruling, Appellant asserts 
that the district court misunderstood the nature of the claim, the Uniform Post 
Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA), and its full authority. 
First, the challenge is to a conviction, not a dismissal. Mr. Huntsman is 
not abstractly challenging his counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal in the 
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original case and this is certainly not a case where a petitioner is complaining his 
rights were violated in a case which was dismissed and never re-filed. 
Instead, Mr. Huntsman is asserting that his conviction and imprisonment 
for the crimes of murder and kidnapping are in violation of the Constitution 
because he received ineffective assistance from the counsel who represented 
him in the trial court on those charges. Counsel failed to file a notice of appeal 
after the dismissal of the original case, and Mr. Huntsman asserts that had 
counsel done so, he would not now be convicted because of the due process 
and/or speedy trial violations, or at most, he would have been tried without the 
evidence the state was only able to use because of the dismissal and re-filing of 
his case.4 
4 The prayer for relief on the dismissal/speedy trial issues in the direct appeal 
was as follows: 
As to the constitutional speedy trial violations, Appellant asserts that the proper 
remedy is to vacate the convictions and dismiss the charges with prejudice, since 
a new trial in the future would not remedy the fact that his first trial was 
unconstitutionally delayed. The same appears true for the errors regarding the 
dismissal and re-filing of the case, since part of those issues was the intentional 
defeat of Mr. Huntsman's statutory speedy trial rights. 
However, to the extent this Court agrees with the error or errors described above 
regarding the dismissal, but disagrees as to the remedy, Appellant suggests an 
alternative where he would be granted a new trial, but be put back in the place he 
was before the dismissal, so that the state loses at least some of the tactical 
advantages that it gained. 
In other words, Appellant could be re-tried, but only with the evidence that the 
state had available to it on September 30, 2005 (and that would have been 
admitted). This means that anything discovered or disclosed after that time, 
including but not limited to the FBI analysis of the gun and the testimony of Steve 
Davis and Trina Clampitt could not be used. As to the gun itself, since the court 
never actually decided whether it would excuse non-compliance with the 
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Other than just outright vacating the convictions, the appropriate and 
necessary remedy for this constitutional violation is reinstatement of the appeal 
of the original case, which procedurally can be done by re-entering the order of 
dismissal which would allow for a notice of appeal to be filed within 42 days. 
It does not appear that the district court would have a problem with re-
entering a judgment of conviction to allow for an appeal. Certainly, there should 
be no problem since that has been the remedy for a failure to file an appeal in 
Idaho going back some 30 years. Flores v. State, 104 Idaho 191, 195 (Ct.App. 
1983). A judgment of conviction can be re-entered so it can be appealed even 
though there is no longer any jurisdiction over the criminal case since it was not 
appealed. 
By the same logic, the remedy for the failure to file an appeal from a 
dismissal should be re-entry of the order of dismissal. In fact, the district court 
acknowledged the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41 
(2011) and actually provided the following quote: 
"Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial 
court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires 
once the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the 
time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal." .. 
. . A district court's dismissal of a criminal case is tantamount 
to a judgment and is final 42 days later, when the time for 
appeal runs .... Jurisdiction of a criminal matter thus expires 
42 days after the district court dismisses the case unless an 
appeal or some statute or rule extends that jurisdiction. 
Id. at p. 47 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted); 
discovery cutoff and allow it under the circumstances, this may be a matter for 
the district court to decide in the first instance. 
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Obviously, the statute or rule which extends the jurisdiction over a 
judgment or dismissal over which jurisdiction has expired is the UPCPA. 
Significantly, the UPCPA does not expressly say that the court may re-establish 
jurisdiction over an otherwise final conviction by reentering a judgment, but this 
authority is based on the provision that allows the court to enter any order that is 
necessary. The relevant provision is as follows: 
§ 19-4907. Hearing -- Evidence -- Order -- Presence of applicant 
(a) . . . . If the court finds in favor of the applicant, it shall enter an 
appropriate order with respect to the conviction or sentence in the 
former proceedings, and any supplementary orders as to 
rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, discharge, correction of 
sentence, or other matters that may be necessary and proper. The 
court shall make specific findings of fact, and state expressly its 
conclusions of law, relating to each issue presented. This order is a 
final judgment. 
I.C. § 19-4907 (emphasis added). 
This interpretation was confirmed by the Court of Appeals in State v. 
Dillard, 110 Idaho 834 (Ct. App. 1986): 
.... However, the state urges that Dillard's right to appeal was 
improperly revived by the district court. The state directs our 
attention to the order entered by the district court in response to 
Dillard's application for post-conviction relief. The ultimate 
disposition made by the court was to dismiss the application. The 
state argues that because the district court dismissed the 
application the court was without jurisdiction or authority to vacate 
the previously entered judgment of conviction and sentences for the 
sole purpose of reinstating Dillard's right to a direct appeal of his 
convictions. 
We disagree. The order included a memorandum decision 
disclosing the court's rationale for the order. When reviewed in its 
entirety, the order clearly shows that the court granted Dillard 
appropriate relief on his application. The order recites: 
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Idaho's Uniform Post-Conviction Act, I.C. § 19-4907, 
provides in pertinent part: "If the court finds in favor of the 
applicant, it shall enter an appropriate order with respect to 
the conviction or sentence in the former proceedings, and 
any supplementary orders as to rearraignment, retrial, 
custody, bail, discharge, correction of sentence, or other 
matters that may be necessary and proper." ( emphasis 
[added by district judge]). 
The Court has consulted with the Prosecuting Attorney and 
defense counsel and finds that no appeal was in fact filed 
and no cause can be shown for an appeal not being filed. 
The Court accordingly follows the opinion of the Idaho Court 
of Appeals in the case of Gilbert Flores v. The State of 
Idaho, 104 Idaho 191 [657 P.2d 488], and the Virginia case 
of Rhodes v. Leverette, [160 W.Va. 781], 239 S.E.2d 136, 
and hereby Orders that the Judgment and sentence imposed 
in Canyon County Case Number C-5034 on the 30th day of 
April, 1982, be vacated. The Judgment of Conviction and 
sentence is re-entered effective the 29th day of August, 
1984, so that Landis Dillard, Jr., may perfect a timely appeal 
from his convictions for Murder and Arson. 
The Court further concludes that, with this relief granted, 
there is no remaining viable issue in the Post-Conviction 
Relief proceeding and hereby serves notice of intent to 
dismiss the Petition [for post-conviction relief]. [Emphasis 
supplied.] 
In its disposition of Dillard's application, the district court found 
guidance from our opinion in Flores v. State, 104 Idaho 191, 657 
P.2d 488 (Ct.App.1981) .... 
We hold that this appeal is not "jurisdictionally defective" and 
therefore we deny the state's request that the appeal be dismissed. 
We turn now to Dillard's issues on appeal. 
Id., p. 837-838. 
In our case, the district court fails to recognize that its authority comes 
from the provision of the UPCPA which allows a court to enter whatever order is 
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necessary and proper if the court finds in favor of the petitioner. Here, since the 
ineffective assistance of counsel occurred in the original case, that is where the 
order is entered that allows his appeal to be revived. In short, Mr. Huntsman is 
entitled to post-conviction relief, and it is beside the point that the challenge to his 
conviction needs to be routed through the original case which was dismissed. 
To hold otherwise would mean that while Petitioner had a right to the 
effective assistance of counsel in his original case, that right has no remedy.5 It 
must also be remembered that the procedural sleight of hand in this case, where 
the original case, which was consolidated with two co-defendants, was dismissed 
and then re-filed and consolidated with the same two co-defendants, occurred 
so the state could indirectly obtain the continuance that it could not directly 
obtain. 
Finally as to the jurisdictional issue, Appellant alternatively asserts that in 
addition to the necessary and proper provision in I.C. § 19-4907, authority to 
enter an order in a dismissed case also comes from the constitutional (Article I, § 
5 of the Idaho Constitution) and/or common law remedy of habeas corpus which 
is now subsumed into the UPCPA. The writ of habeas corpus has always been 
able to remedy illegal custody regardless of whether there is a judgment of 
conviction.6 
5 Unless his convictions were dismissed outright based on the ineffective 
assistance of counsel in the predecessor case, which Petitioner of course would 
not oppose. 
6 Custody, not conviction, is also the test in federal habeas, the current version of 
that statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides: 
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court 
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This is shown by Johnson v. State, 85 Idaho 123 (1962), which concerned 
the former version of the habeas corpus statute: 
The purpose of a Writ of Habeas Corpus is expressed by statute as 
follows: "Every person unlawfully committed, detained, confined or 
restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, may 
prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such 
imprisonment or restraint." I.C. § 19-4201. The applications claim 
unlawful confinement and restraint and set out facts which we 
consider substantiate such claims; in particular it is charged that 
appellant was held over 30 days without being allowed to contact 
his mother or without being allowed to contact an attorney. It is also 
charged that appellant was denied the right to contact his 
witnesses .... 
Id. at p. 127. 
The current version of the habeas corpus statute limits relief for an in-state 
prisoner to conditions of his confinement, revocation of parole, miscalculation of 
his sentence, loss of good time credits, and a detainer lodged against him. I.C. § 
19-4203. However, the constitutional and/or common law remedy for other illegal 
custody situations has not disappeared because the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus shall not be suspended (except in situations not applicable here). 
Rather, it is now part of the UPCPA. As explained by the Supreme Court in 
Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235 (1969): 
This court has previously stated that the Writ of Habeas Corpus is a 
constitutional remedy and statutes enacted to add to the efficacy of 
the writ should be construed so as to promote the effectiveness of 
the proceeding. Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 392 P.2d 279 
(1964). This court, therefore, construes the Uniform Post Conviction 
Procedure Act as an expansion of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and 
not as a denial of the same. 
shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the 
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States. 
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Id. at p. 237. 
In other words, while the district court thought the problem was that the 
ineffective assistance of counsel leading to a conviction occurred in the 
predecessor case in which an order of dismissal was entered, there really is no 
problem because habeas corpus does not rely on conviction, but custody. While 
the habeas statute no longer allows for such a claim to be brought under it, since 
the writ cannot be suspended, that means this sort of claim can now be brought 
under the UPCPA and an order can be entered in a case in which there is no 
conviction. 
Accordingly, the district court erred when it dismissed the failure to appeal 
claim because it erroneously believed it could not re-enter the order of dismissal 
so as to allow its appeal. 
As to the district court's alternative timeliness grounds for dismissal, this is 
also incorrect. In short, the court ruled that a petition for post-conviction relief 
needed to be filed within a year and 42 days of the order of dismissal in order to 
challenge the ineffectiveness of counsel in failing to file a notice of appeal. 
But the court fails to realize that the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failing to appeal was not ripe until the Court of Appeals held that the 
appellate issues from the original case were not preserved, which occurred more 
than one year and 42 days after the order of dismissal. The issues were in fact 
raised, and had the Court of Appeals actually considered them, there would be 
no prejudice from failing to file the notice of appeal and so no ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. Even the district court used Petitioner's attempt to 
23 
raise the issues on appeal as proof of the prejudice prong, to wit, that Petitioner 
would have appealed at the time of the dismissal but for counsel's failure to 
consult with him about an appeal. 
Thus, the time in which to file the petition for post-conviction relief runs 
from the end of the direct appeal and so it was timely. 
11. 
THE COURT ERRED BY SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE FAILURE TO 
PRESERVE SPEEDY TRIAL CLAIM BECAUSE THERE WAS A REASONABLE 
PROBABILITY THAT SAID CLAIM WOULD HAVE BEEN MERITORIOUS 
A. Counsel's Failure to Preserve Issue for Appeal 
The district court explained the background of this issue in its 
Memorandum Opinion on Summary Dismissal: 
After the charges against Petitioner were refiled in case number 
H0501438, Petitioner filed Motion to Dismiss on January 6, 2006, 
arguing that the State had intentionally violated his constitutional 
and statutory rights to a speedy trial. Apparently the trial court 
never heard argument on Petitioner's motion to dismiss, and never 
rendered a decision with regard to this motion. Petitioner asserts 
that Mr. Myshin's performance was deficient in that he failed to fully 
prosecute this motion and obtain a ruling. Further, Petitioner was 
prejudiced as a result because he was denied the opportunity to 
argue the speedy trial issues on direct appeal. Amended Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief at 5-6. In its decision on Petitioner's 
direct appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals specifically concluded 
that the issue had not been preserved for appeal, due to 
Petitioner's failure to obtain ruling on his motion. Huntsman, 146 
Idaho at 586, 199 P.3d at 161. 
Memorandum Decision on Summary Disposition at p. 8. (R. p. 598.) 
The district court's analysis of the claim is as follows: 
Mr. Myshin's failure to prosecute the motion to dismiss, in effect, 
amounted to a failure to file the motion at all. The failure to file a 
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motion is considered deficient performance by counsel if there is "a 
reasonable probability that the motion would have been 
meritorious." [internal citations omitted] The Court finds that 
Petitioner has made no such showing. First, Petitioner asserts that 
his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated by the refiling of 
charges by the State. However, if a felony case is dismissed 
pursuant I.C.R. 48(a)(2), the six month requirement of I.C. § 19-
3501 is renewed upon the refiling of the charge. State v. Horsley, 
117 Idaho 920,926, 792 P.2 945,951 (1990); see also State v. 
Goodmiller, 86 Idaho 233, 386 P.2d 365 (1963). Even a violation of 
I.C. § 19-3501 does not necessarily implicate the constitutional right 
to a speedy trial. The Idaho Court of Appeals rejected a defendant's 
argument that dismissing a charge without prejudice following a 
violation of this statute, which then allowed the charges to be 
refiled, necessarily infringed on her fundamental right to a speedy 
trial. State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 842, 118 P.3 160, 174 (Ct. App. 
2005). 
Second, Petitioner asserts that his constitutional speedy trial rights 
were violated. In evaluating an alleged speedy trial right violation 
under both the United States Constitution and the Idaho 
Constitution, Idaho courts employ the balancing test set forth in 
Barkerv. Wingo, 407 U.S. 51 (1972). Davis, 141 Idaho at 836, 118 
P.3d at 168. The four factors to be weighed under this test are: "(1) 
the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the 
defendant's assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) the 
prejudice occasioned by the delay." Id., citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 
530. 
The calculation of delay is stricter under the Idaho Constitution: the 
period of delay is measured from the date formal charges are filed 
or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first. Davis, 141 
Idaho at 836, 118 P .3d at 168, quoting State v. Young, 136 Idaho 
113, 117, 29 P.3d 949 953 (2001). Petitioner was arrested on 
March 24, 2005, and the charges against Petitioner in case number 
H0500555 were dismissed on October 7, 2005. The calculation of 
delay does not incorporate the period in between the dismissal of 
charges in H0500555 and the filing of charges in H0501438 on 
October 11, 2005. Davis, 141 Idaho at 836, 118 P.3d at 168, citing 
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 (1982). Petitioner's jury 
trial began on April 10, 2006. Accordingly, the total period of delay 
was just over twelve months. The nature of the case is an important 
consideration in a court' analysis of the delay: "Delay that can be 
tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a 
serious, complex conspiracy charge." Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 118 
P.3d at 169 (citation omitted). 
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Petitioner's case could certainly be considered complex. However, 
assuming that a delay of just over twelve months in a case 
involving murder and kidnapping I charges would be considered 
presumptively prejudicial, the Court must then consider the reason 
for the delay. Although Petitioner points out that the State was 
originally willing to take him to trial despite not having the murder 
weapon, the desire of the State to further investigate this evidence, 
rather than simply ignore it, is reasonable. As to the third Barker 
factor, Petitioner affirmatively asserted his speedy trial right during 
the September 30, 2005 hearing on the motion to continue trial. 
Finally, with regard to prejudice, Petitioner asserts that the delay 
gave the State the opportunity to strengthen its case against 
Petitioner, as well as to introduce certain evidence it would have 
been prevented from utilizing in the first case, due to the expiration 
of the discovery period. There is no indication, however, that the 
delay infringed on Petitioner's ability to adequately prepare his 
defense. See Davis, 141 Idaho at 840,118 P.3d at 172, citing State 
v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576 583,990 P.2d 742, 749 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
In balancing these four factors, the Court cannot conclude that 
Petitioner has demonstrated reasonable probability that his motion 
to dismiss would have been meritorious. Accordingly, Petitioner has 
not raised an issue of fact as to whether Mr. Myshin's failure to fully 
prosecute the motion to dismiss constituted deficient performance. 
Summary dismissal is therefore appropriate as to Petitioner's claim 
for ineffective assistance of counsel regarding a failure to preserve 
the speed trial issue for appeal. 
Memorandum Decision on Summary Disposition at p. 8-10. (R. p. 598-600.) 
B. The Speedy Trial Arguments From Appellant's Opening Brief in the Direct 
Appeal 
Unlike in the failure to appeal issue above where the district court does a 
fair job of explaining an argument from Appellant's opening brief in the direct 
appeal, it does not for this one. Appellant argued far more than a mere statutory 
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speedy trial violation arising from the dismissal and re-filing in addition to a 
Barker v. Wingo analysis. 7 
Rather, Appellant also argued a due process violation from the state 
dismissing and re-filing to defeat Mr. Huntsman's speedy trial rights and to gain a 
tactical advantage over him. Appellant further argued a due process violation 
because Mr. Huntsman was deprived of an impartial judge because the trial 
judge coached the prosecution as to how to do an end run around his speedy 
trial rights. For brevity's sake, Appellant here will not repeat these arguments in 
full, but incorporate them and Appellant's opening brief from the direct appeal by 
this reference as if set forth in full. 8 Appellant asserts that these arguments 
show that trial counsel's Motion to Dismiss filed on January 6, 2006, arguing that 
the State had intentionally violated his constitutional and statutory rights to a 
speedy trial had a reasonable probability of being granted at the district court 
level and/or being meritorious before the Court of Appeals had the issue been 
preserved. 
The same is true as to the Barker v. Wingo speedy trial claim. For this, 
the district court here did slightly better and discussed the analysis in a little more 
detail, but still fell far short of discussing Appellant's actual arguments. 
Accordingly, Appellant here will provide verbatim the speedy trial arguments from 
said brief which show that that there is a reasonable probability that the 
arguments would have been meritorious at the trial or appellate level, and thus 
7 Barkerv. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). 
8 Appellant's entire speedy trial/due process argument runs from page 4-40 of 
Appellant's brief in the direct appeal, which appears in this record at p. 475-508. 
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counsel's failure to preserve the speedy trial issue was cognizable ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
Before Appellant's arguments are set forth, a part of the issue addressed 
below but appearing in an earlier section of Appellant's opening brief must be 
explained. This concerns discovery deadlines which were missed by the state, 
but reset (and thus the state could comply with them) when the case was re-filed. 
As explained in Appellant's opening brief from the direct appeal, the jury 
trial was set for October 11, 2005, and the discovery cutoff date was September 
9, 2005. (R. 440.) On September 9, 2005, the state filed a motion to extend 
time to comply with discovery for five different subject areas: fingerprint testing, 
computer forensic examination and analysis, ballistics testing including 
comparison of bullet, spent casing, and live rounds, and two areas of DNA 
testing. (R. 432-433.) On September 14, 2005, the defense filed a motion to 
exclude this evidence. (R. 440.) Following a hearing on September 21, 2005, 
the court granted the state's motion to extend time for the two subject areas 
related to DNA, but denied it as to the remaining three, including the ballistics 
testing. (R. 459.) 
C. Mr. Huntsman's speedy trial rights under the State and Federal 
Constitutions were violated 
In State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849, 153 P.3d 1195 (Ct.App. 2006), the Court 
of Appeals explained the general principles regarding the right to speedy trial: 
Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's right to a 
speedy trial presents a mixed question of law and fact. We will 
defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by 
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substantial and competent evidence, but we will exercise free 
review of the trial court's conclusions of law. 
A defendant in a criminal action is guaranteed the right to a speedy 
trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and under Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. This 
protection is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy 
incarceration prior to trial; to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless 
substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while 
released on bail; and to shorten the disruption of life caused by 
arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges. 
To determine whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy 
trial was violated, under both the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions we employ the balancing test set forth in Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). In 
Barker, the United States Supreme Court identified four factors that 
are weighed to determine whether there has been a constitutional 
violation. Those factors are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the 
reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his or her right 
to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice occasioned by the delay. 
Id., 153 P.3d at 1198-1199 (footnote and internal citations omitted). 
Appellant will discuss each of the four factors from Barker v. Wingo, supra, 
in turn, further discussing both the legal principles involved and then the 
particulars of our case. 9 
1. Length of delay. 
As to the first factor, Avila, supra, explained as follows: 
The length of delay serves a dual role in the analysis of the right to 
a speedy trial. First, it is a triggering mechanism, for until there is 
some delay that is presumptively prejudicial, it is unnecessary to 
inquire into the other three factors. Second, it is one of the factors 
9 As to re~iew of this issue, while as discussed above, the district court did not 
appear to actually rule on the motion, given the comments of the court (and 
counsel), its denial was a foregone conclusion. The facts are not in dispute, so 
our focus concerns the conclusion that there was no speedy trial violation, which 
is implicit in the fact that the court did not grant the motion and that the trial 
occurred. 
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to be considered once the balancing process is triggered. Id. The 
State argues that a delay of approximately nine months is not 
sufficient to trigger the Barker balancing test. That is an issue we 
need not decide because, even assuming a sufficient triggering 
delay, Avila has not shown that his right to a speedy trial was 
violated under the Barker balancing test. 
Id., 153 P.3d at p. 1199 (internal citations omitted). 
A vi/a noted that for Sixth Amendment purposes, the period of delay is 
measured from the date of the indictment or else the actual restraints imposed by 
arrest and holding to answer on a criminal charge. Under the Idaho Constitution, 
it is measured from the date formal charges are filed or the defendant is arrested, 
whichever occurs first. Id., n. 4. 
In our case, Mr. Huntsman's jury trial began on April 10, 2006. The 
original indictment was filed on April 26, 2005, so the delay from it was 
approximately 11 ½ months. Mr. Huntsman had actually been arrested for first 
degree murder on March 24, 2005. Therefore, the period of delay from the arrest 
to trial was approximately 12½ months based on the analysis used under the 
Idaho Constitution. As explained in State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 837, 118 P.3d 
160 (Ct.App. 2005), in determining when the speedy trial right arises, the stricter 
standard under the Idaho Constitution applies. Thus, our delay here was over 
one year. However, Appellant is also specifically asserting that a violation of his 
speedy trial right under the Federal Constitution occurred as well. 
In State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 160 P.3d 1284 (Ct.App. 2007), the Court 
of Appeals explained as follows as to the length of delay: 
Barker's four-part speedy trial test creates no bright line 
boundaries. Rather, the Supreme Court pointed out that because of 
the imprecision of the right to a speedy trial, the length of delay that 
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will provoke an inquiry into whether those rights have been violated 
is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the 
case. The nature of the case is also of import in determining the 
period of delay that can be tolerated, for the period that is 
reasonable for prosecution of an ordinary street crime is 
considerably less than for a complex conspiracy charge. 
Here, the delay was sufficient to trigger inquiry. The nature of the 
charges Lopez was facing, two counts of grand theft and one of 
burglary, cannot be characterized as complex, for all three 
stemmed from items alleged to have been taken by Lopez during a 
single burglary with one accomplice. Our Supreme Court has held 
that a delay of fourteen months in a drug delivery case is sufficient 
to trigger a constitutional speedy trial inquiry. Lindsay, 96 Idaho at 
476, 531 P.2d at 238. Similarly, this Court has held that a delay of 
one year in a robbery case is presumptively prejudicial, see State v. 
Campbell, 104 Idaho 705, 708, 662 P.2d 1149, 1152 
(Ct.App.1983), and that a delay of over thirteen months was 
sufficient to trigger analysis in a complex conspiracy case. See 
State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 34, 921 P.2d 206, 211 
(Ct.App.1996). Here, the delay was nearly seventeen months. That 
period is long enough to be presumptively prejudicial and therefore 
provoke an inquiry into whether Lopez's constitutional speedy trial 
rights were violated. 
Id., 160 P.3d at 1288 (internal citations omitted). 
In our case, Appellant asserts that the delay of over one year is sufficient 
to trigger the speedy trial analysis (as is the slightly under one year delay), and 
also, that the delay weighs in Mr. Huntsman's favor. 
While it may seem like at first glance that a murder case where the state 
called approximately 39 witnesses would take an extended time to prepare, that 
was not the situation here. Until the gun showed up two weeks before trial, the 
state was fully prepared to proceed to trial within six months of the filing of the 
indictment and did not need further time to prepare its case. The state had not 
attempted to delay that trial setting for any reason, and the only indication of any 
problem was the motion to extend the discovery cutoff as to five things, but even 
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after the court only partially granted the extension, the state did not move for a 
continuance, but was prepared to proceed. 
Also, while the state may have made the trial relatively lengthy because 
of the amount of evidence it felt it needed to present and the way it chose to 
present it, this was not a complex crime. While the level of harm from the crime 
may have been high, it was still just a street crime. There was no complex 
conspiracy, but just a straightforward murder with only one eyewitness who 
testified, Kyle Quinton, who was also able to testify as to the kidnapping of 
himself and Becky. 
It is clear that it was not the complexity of the crime or need for extensive 
preparation which resulted in it taking over one year to get to trial, but instead, it 
was the desire of the state to have one more piece of evidence to present 
against Mr. Huntsman that caused the time to trial to go from approximately six 
months to 12. Therefore, since Mr. Huntsman could have been (and almost was) 
tried in six months, the further delay is sufficient to both trigger the speedy trial 
analysis and also weighs heavily in his favor. 
2. Assertion of speedy trial rights. 
As to this factor, Lopez, supra, explained as follows: 
Lopez did not assert his right to speedy trial until he filed his motion 
to dismiss on October 4, 2005, two days before the date ultimately 
set for trial. He at no time requested a more expeditious trial. The 
lateness of Lopez's assertion of his speedy trial right weighs heavily 
against his contention that the right was violated. That is, the timing 
of a defendant's assertion of the right tends to disclose whether a 
defendant actually desired a speedy trial, and is closely related to 
and affects other Barker factors, including prejudice and reasons 
for the delay. Here, the late assertion of the right weighs 
significantly against Lopez in balancing the speedy trial factors. 
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Id., 160 P.3d at p. 1288 (internal citations omitted). 
In our case, there is no question that Mr. Huntsman actually desired a 
speedy trial. In fact, the very problem was that Mr. Huntsman absolutely refused 
to waive his right to a speedy trial and wanted to go to trial as scheduled. This 
was true despite the fact that his co-defendants waived their speedy trial rights 
and wanted the trial continued. 
Besides refusing to waive his rights when others were doing so, Mr. 
Huntsman affirmatively asserted his speedy trial rights by his opposition to the 
state's motion to dismiss as well as filing his own motion to dismiss after the 
charges were re-filed. 
Given the unequivocal and repeated way in which Mr. Huntsman asserted 
his right to a speedy trial, this factor should weigh heavily in Appellant's favor. 
3. Reason for the delay. 
In Davis, supra, the Court of Appeals said the following about this factor: 
In evaluating the reason for the delay, different weights are 
assigned to different reasons. Our speedy trial standards recognize 
that pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly justifiable. We 
attach great weight to considerations such as the state's need for 
time to collect witnesses, oppose pretrial motions, or locate the 
defendant in the event that he or she goes into hiding. A valid 
reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify 
appropriate delay. However, there is an enormous difference 
between being inconvenienced and being unavailable. True 
unavailability suggests an unqualified inability to attend, while 
inconvenience merely implies that attendance at trial would be 
burdensome. 
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the 
defense should be weighed heavily against the state. A more 
neutral reason, such as negligence or overcrowded courts, should 
be weighed less heavily but nevertheless should be considered 
since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest 
with the state rather than with the defendant. While not compelling 
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relief in every case where a bad-faith delay would make relief 
virtually automatic, neither is negligence automatically tolerable 
simply because the accused cannot demonstrate exactly how it has 
prejudiced him or her. Although negligence is weighed more lightly 
than a deliberate intent to harm the accused's defense, it still falls 
on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and 
unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution. 
Id., 141 Idaho at 837-838 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted). 
In our case, the reason for the delay is clear, the state wanted to test, 
evaluate, and admit the gun that they believed was the murder weapon. Since it 
was the state which delayed the trial for its sole benefit, this factor of course 
weighs in Mr. Huntsman's favor. The real question is just how much weight to 
assign to it. 
First, the state delayed the trial in a manner which hampered the defense. 
Instead of being tried within six months, the state dismissed and re-filed the case 
in order to get around Mr. Huntsman's statutory speedy trial rights and to 
indirectly obtain the continuance that it could not obtain directly. Since these 
machinations were specifically designed to defeat Mr. Huntsman's statutory 
speedy trial rights, they should weigh heavily in his favor in a constitutional 
speedy trial analysis. 
Second, the state delayed the trial in order to hinder the defense by 
getting around the discovery deadline which allowed it to produce more evidence 
against Mr. Huntsman. The discovery cutoff contained in the court's order 
required it to disclose evidence by September 9, 2005. By delaying the trial, the 
state was able to have the discovery deadline reset (and then reset again), which 
allowed it to introduce evidence that was not in compliance with the court's order. 
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Third, the state delayed the trial in order to further hinder the defense by 
producing better evidence against Mr. Huntsman, to wit, a ballistics analysis of 
the gun. While the state's goal of testing and evaluating the gun may at first 
seem reasonable, it does not, upon close review, mitigate the delay. It must be 
remembered that the state obtained an indictment and proceeded with the 
prosecution and was about to go to trial without the murder weapon. While no 
doubt it would have preferred to have the weapon, it obviously did not believe it 
was a vital enough piece of evidence that it should wait to charge Mr. Huntsman 
until after it was obtained. 
It was only when the weapon was located that the state expressed its 
discomfort at proceeding to trial without it. So just as Davis distinguished 
between inconvenience and true unavailability in the case of a missing witness, 
the same should be true for the missing murder weapon. While the state may 
have preferred to have it at trial, it obviously did not believe that it needed it, 
despite its later claims to the contrary. 
Fourth, the delay must be evaluated by reference to the evidence the state 
could have produced anyway without any delay. Once the gun showed up, the 
state still could have proceeded without it as it had intended to do for the last six 
months and caused no delay. Or, without any delay, the court could have 
decided to let in the gun despite non-compliance with the discovery cutoff. 10 In 
10 When granting the state's motion to dismiss, the court stated that its choices 
were to not allow the gun in due to the discovery cut off or to allow it in which 
would prejudice the defendant. Since neither one of these alternatives were 
acceptable to the court, it instead did something much worse for the defendant 
by dismissing the action, which had the effect of allowing the gun in anyway 
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this event, the state could have established via the serial number that it had been 
stolen from the victim's stepfather. Also, it could have established that it was the 
gun involved based on the witness descriptions. At trial, not only did Kyle testify 
it was the same gun based on its general appearance, but more persuasively, 
Doc positively identified it as the same one because he had disassembled it and 
damaged it while trying to cut off the barrel. (Tr. p. 2000-2001.) It is significant 
the state did not even request this middle ground option of being allowed to 
introduce the late disclosed gun at the originally scheduled trial, but went straight 
to requests that would cause delay, first asking for a continuance and, when that 
failed, a dismissal. 
Of course the state was able to delay the trial and did have the revolver 
tested by the FBI and compared to the bullet recovered from the decedent. 
Given the deformity of the bullet, it could not be determined that it was fired from 
the revolver. (Tr. p. 2580.) Certain consistencies between the bullet and gun 
could be seen, including the number of lands and grooves and their width, along 
with the direction of the twist. (Tr. p. 2580-2581.) The gun was also compared 
to an empty shell casing which was found in McPeak's trailer under the bed in a 
bedroom he stated he had rented to Mr. Huntsman. (Tr. p. 2194.) McPeak 
testified that Mr. Huntsman told him that he had shot the victim and then threw 
McPeak the empty casing from which he said the shot was fired. McPeak flipped 
it back, and it went under the bed. (Tr. p. 949-950.) The FBI determined that the 
casing was fired in the revolver. (Tr. p. 2568- 2569.) 
because there was a new discovery cutoff in the new case, as well as the FBI 
analysis, and the additional new evidence discussed below. 
36 
Finally as to the reason for the delay factor, the last consideration is the 
reason the prosecution did not earlier have the weapon. At the motion hearing, 
the state claimed that it did not have and could not have possessed the weapon 
until it was given to them the day before, but Appellant asserts that this 
overstates the reality of the situation. 
At trial, the lead police detective on the case testified that there were 
several scenes in the investigation, with one being Doc's trailer located in Boise. 
(Tr. p. 2172-2173.) On September 29, 2005, the detective went to Doc's trailer 
because prosecutors were having a hard time contacting him. (Tr. p. 2215.) 
Doc told him he had something to give the police, they went into the back 
bedroom and Doc pulled out from under the bed, a grey case that contained part 
of a blued revolver. (Tr. p. 2186-2187.) Doc had previously told police that he 
did not have the gun. (Tr. p. 2215.) Then, some four days later while the 
detective was meeting with Doc at the prosecutor's office, Doc said he had some 
additional stuff to give him. (Tr. p. 2214, 2237.) Back at Doc's trailer, Doc 
handed him a speed loader (and its case) loaded with five .38 special cartridges. 
(Tr. p. 2192, 2214 & 2237.) 
Significant to our point, the lead detective testified that Doc's trailer was 
never searched, but the detective did not know why not. (Tr. p. 2242.) Doc had 
actually told police that he had the weapon at his residence at one point, and had 
disassembled it and it had somehow disappeared from his residence. (Tr. 
9/30/05, p. 78.) The detective testified that Doc had repeatedly lied to police. (Tr. 
p. 2242-2243.) Also, the police knew from the beginning that Doc was involved 
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(he helped dispose of the body). (Tr. p. 2260.) The detective claimed that they 
only later learned that a number of acts involved in the case occurred at Doc's 
trailer. (Tr. p. 2260.) Yet it was established that even early in the case the police 
were aware that Kyle and Becky had been staying at Doc's trailer (which is 
where they were taken from at the beginning of the events), Hanslovan had 
stayed there, Doc's truck was involved in the disposal of the body, and as a 
result of the truck being used, that some of the principals in the case had been to 
Doc's trailer. (Tr. p. 2260-2261.) The detective testified that he did not think any 
of that was significant enough to search the trailer at that time. (Tr. p. 2261.) 
While it is unclear just why the police never at any time searched Doc's 
trailer (which would have presumably located the gun much earlier), it is clear 
that the police would have had enough reason to search Doc's trailer at some 
point. The failure to perform this search is completely incongruous with the 
extensive investigation undertaken in the case which included many search 
warrants and searches. Of course Appellant is not claiming that what the police 
should have done is somehow at issue as to the merits of the trial, but the fact 
that they never looked (but obviously could have) is relevant to the state's claims 
that they could not have earlier obtained the gun. 
Further, it was not Mr. Huntsman who had prevented the state from having 
the gun, but one of the state's witnesses who had been given immunity from the 
very beginning of the case. (Tr. p. 2005-2006.) While the state characterized 
Doc as being associated with the defense, he was not a defense witness nor did 
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his testimony assist Mr. Huntsman, and he was actually held in contempt for 
calling the defense attorney a derogatory name during trial. (R. 338.) 
To summarize the various components of the reason for the delay factor, 
the reason for the delay was so the state could produce more and better 
evidence against Mr. Huntsman. The state manufactured the delay by 
dismissing the case in a deliberate maneuver to do an end run around Mr. 
Huntsman's statutory speedy trial rights, which resulted in another six month 
delay, and which allowed the discovery cutoff to be reset so that it could use 
otherwise excludable evidence. In short, the state deliberately delayed the trial 
to hamper the defendant, both procedurally and substantively. 
As to whether or not the delay was even important or not, the delay was 
unnecessary since the state was prepared to proceed without the evidence. 
Further, the state could have established that it was the gun involved even 
without the ballistics testing, but did not even ask to do so and instead just 
manufactured the delay. While the need for the delay was not important to the 
ability of the state to proceed, the results of it were devastating to the defendant. 
Finally, the state did not really have a good reason for why it did not earlier 
find the gun, since the police's failure to ever search the crime scene at Doc's 
trailer is just inexplicable. Even if this omission was just good faith negligence 
(and not for some intentional bad faith reason), the delay was still not the fault of 
Mr. Huntsman. 
For all of these reasons, the reason for the delay should weigh heavily in 
Mr. Huntsman's favor. 
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4. Prejudice from the delay. 
As to this factor, Avila, supra, explained: 
The final and most compelling factor to be considered in the Barker 
balancing test is prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay. 
Prejudice is assessed in light of the interests of defendants, which 
the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect. Those interests 
are: ( 1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing 
anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility 
that the defense will be impaired. Infringement on the third interest 
is the most serious form of prejudice because the inability of the 
defendant to adequately prepare his or her case skews the fairness 
of the entire adjudicatory process. If a defendant does not even 
attempt to make a showing of a reasonable possibility of prejudice, 
this factor should be given a very light weight, if any, for the 
defendant. 
In this case, Avila was continuously incarcerated in a county jail for 
nearly nine months while awaiting trial, during which time he was 
not employed and was separated from his family. He likely felt the 
anxiety and concern that any incarcerated individual would suffer. 
Avila also contends that his defense was actually impaired by the 
delay. He argues that the State had been unprepared at the earlier 
trial date, and after the delay, was better able to prove each 
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This argument, 
however, bears no support in the record. There is no evidence that 
the State was actually unprepared to meet its burden of proof on 
the initial charge if the trial had gone forward on April 26 . 
. . . In Barker, the Court posited that prejudicial delays occur when 
witnesses die or disappear during a delay, when defense witnesses 
become unable to recall accurately events of the distant past, and 
the like. In these situations, the prejudice is a result of the delay, 
and the harm to the defendant would likely not have occurred if the 
trial had proceeded in a timely manner. 
Id., 153 P.3d 1200-1201 (internal citations omitted). 
In our case, the prejudice from the delay is tangible. Mr. Huntsman was of 
course incarcerated for the year before his trial, it being first degree murder. But 
more importantly, unlike Avila, in our case the additional evidence produced 
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against Mr. Huntsman due to the delay is clear from the record. After the delay, 
the state introduced not only the gun because the discovery deadline was reset, 
but also the FBI analysis discussed above, which positively would not have 
happened without the delay. 
Further, the state was able to introduce at trial the other items of evidence 
(discussed in the statement of proceeding) for which it requested but did not 
receive an extension of the discovery cutoff, because the discovery cutoff was 
reset from September 9, 2005, to February 18, 2006. In addition to these items 
of evidence that it could now introduce, the state had another six months to 
continue to build a stronger case against Mr. Huntsman and produce evidence it 
did not have at the time the trial was originally scheduled. 
The most significant example of this was the very damaging testimony of 
Steve Davis, who would not have testified had the trial not been delayed. Steve 
Davis, who was problematic for two additional reasons discussed below, was an 
inmate who worked in the prison law library and testified at trial that, among other 
things, Mr. Huntsman at first told him that he did not commit the crime, but later 
told him that he had shot the decedent in the face because they were having an 
argument and the decedent swore at him. (Tr. p. 2382, 2386.) The problem is 
that Steve Davis did not meet with police and tell them this until the first part of 
November of 2005, at which time the trial would have been over had it occurred 
as scheduled on October 11, 2005. (Tr. p. 2668.) 
Another example of the state obtaining evidence during the delay is a 
witness that was not disclosed until March 27, 2006, but who testified at the trial. 
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Trina Clampitt, who is also problematic for two additional reasons discussed 
below, was the mother of Becky B. As discussed further below, she testified 
that, among other things, she saw an abrasion in the roof of Becky's mouth, 
which corroborated that a gun had been put in Becky's mouth. 11 
Accordingly, since Mr. Huntsman suffered actual prejudice in that 
additional damaging evidence was introduced against him that would not have 
been had the delay not occurred, this factor weighs in his favor as well. 
5. Balancing. 
Finally, as to the balancing, Avila explained as follows: 
The four Barker factors, together with any other relevant 
circumstances, must be balanced and weighed to determine 
whether an individual's right to a speedy trial was violated. None of 
the factors standing alone are either necessary or sufficient to 
establish a constitutional violation. 
Id., 153 P.3d at 1201 (internal citations omitted). 
As to the balancing of these factors in our case, little is needed since while 
they may weigh more or less, they all are in favor of Mr. Huntsman. In short, the 
delay was long enough to be presumptively prejudicial, and he did nothing to 
bring the delay upon himself (except to insist on his statutory speedy trial rights). 
Instead, the delay was solely for the benefit of the state and to his detriment. Mr. 
Huntsman asserted his rights, and he was tangibly prejudiced by the delay. 
Accordingly, this case should have been dismissed for violation of Mr. 
Huntsman's speedy trial rights under the Idaho and Federal Constitutions. 
11 This testimony was important to the state because the police officer who took 
photos of Becky's injuries reported that she saw none in her mouth and the 
photos showed none, although at trial the officer testified that Becky was not 
being cooperative and would not open her mouth wide enough. 
42 
D. The Court Erred in Summarily Denying the Failure to Preserve the Speedy 
Trial Claim 
Again, the post-conviction court's ruling was that after balancing the four 
factors, it cannot conclude that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable 
probability that his motion to dismiss would have been meritorious. Appellant 
disagrees and asserts he has shown exactly why the motion to dismiss (or 
appeal of its denial) would have been meritorious. In addition, the due process 
arguments arising from the dismissal and re-filing which defeated his speedy trial 
rights would have been meritorious. Accordingly, the post-conviction court's 
summary dismissal of this issue must be reversed and the convictions vacated 
without retrial since this is the proper remedy for the speedy trial violation as was 
requested in the direct appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above, Appellant/Petitioner 
respectfully requests that the district court's denial of post-co viction relief be 
reversed. . d--. 
DATED this~ day of July, 2013. 
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